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HOUSING THEORY: IMPOVERSISHED, ETHICALLY SPEAKING 
Mark Stephens, The Urban Institute, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK 
In this commentary on the Focus articles by David Clapham and Hannu Ruonavaara 
(this issue), I argue that whilst it is not possible to construct a single theory of 
housing, economics (properly applied) provides sufficient concepts to provide a rich 
explanatory tool kit. I illustrate this with reference to the role of housing in the Global 
Financial Crisis, and suggest that the failure of economic forecasting should be 
distinguished from the ability to explain what happened and why. A narrowly 
economics approach pays insufficient attention to institutions, especially social 
institutions, but these are correctable. I go on to argue that economics lacks the 
necessary ethical dimension to underpin the evaluation of public policy including 
housing. “Wellbeing” can help us to devise better outcome indicators, but it is 
another iteration of utilitarianism. As such it lags behind the advances made in moral 
philosophy that would help to provide an ethical basis for assessing distributional 
questions arising from housing systems, and, more recently, the arguments 
advanced in favour of a more plural capabilities approach as a basis for evaluating 
policy. I conclude that housing could be a fertile testing ground for such approaches, 
and indeed for informing their development.   
Why is there no theory of housing? 
Both Ruonavaara and Clapham ask whether there is a theory of housing. “[A]nything 
that has a linked set of concepts and propositions,” writes Clapham, “constitutes 
theory”. For a theory of housing to exist, Ruonavaara suggests that causation is also 
required to form a hypothesis “to which all housing-related topics can be related”. 
Both scholars agree that there is, and is unlikely to be, a (grand) theory of housing.  
For Ruonavaara the stumbling block is that “housing is not a research topic but a 
common denominator of a number of research topics: housing policy, housing 
provision, housing organizations [etc]” (p. xx). For Clapham, the barrier is the “unique 
nature of housing” (p. xx). The complexity of housing has required it to be examined 
through “the lens of different disciplines” (p. xx). Whilst it would be desirable for 
these perspectives to be brought together into “a coherent single theory” this is 
presently hindered by frequent incompatibility between “paradigms and concepts” (p. 
xx). Consequently, “[t]he most that can be expected is for the derivation of a number 
of trans-disciplinary concepts that could eventually be built up into a universal theory 
of housing” (p. xx).  
I am not wholly convinced by the first of these explanations. Whether housing is a 
research topic or a common denominator is a moot point. Either way it may not be 
possible to explain all of the inter-relationships. It is frequently stated that housing is 
“unique” and Duncan Maclennan’s (1982) book Housing Economics (which Clapham 
cites) highlighted many of its unique features. (That housing is unique does not, of 
course, preclude other phenomenon – health, for example – from also being unique.)    
Economics, however, can provide a rich set of concepts that form a powerful 
explanatory tool kit. 
The role of housing in what became known as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 
Europe and the Great Recession in North America can be used to illustrate this 
point. that economics provides a rich explanatory took kit that reflects housing’s 
special or unique features.  These include: its role as being both a consumption good 
and an investment good; with the important character of being spatially fixed; and, 
particularly in the present era of globalisation, fascinatingly prone to instability as the 
most mobile factor of production (finance) is invested in (or disinvested from) the 
least mobile (land). Sophisticated financial instruments such as mortgage backed 
securities can be judged as being efficient because they unbundle the process of 
intermediation, allowing efficiency-gaining specialisation, allocating and pricing risk in 
the market. However, such specialisation creates a problem of asymmetric 
information between parties. Credit rating agencies were supposed to represent a 
solution to this problem, by providing investors with information about the risk of 
default associated with securitised mortgages. However, when banks realised that 
the credit rating agencies had failed to perform this function, US sub-prime crisis 
morphed into a global credit crunch in 2007 as the wholesale markets seized up.. 
“Next time we’ll get sub-prime right,” quipped a distinguished economist at a meeting 
I attended at the World Bank in 2007. The important point is that the key “unique” 
attributes of housing reflected in this account are comfortably explained by familiar 
economic concepts.  
Of course the credit crunch was not the end of the story, because the credit crunch 
morphed into the GFC in 2008 and, in turn, into a sovereign debt crisis in some 
countries such as Greece 2010. (Ironically, the “markets” believed the credit rating 
agencies’ ability to assess the risks associated with government bonds.) These 
stages unfolded from the housing and housing finance system, but have little to do 
with housing: the decision by the US Government not to bail out Lehman Brothers 
being the most important trigger for the banking and economic crisis. 
This summary of the GFC points to the most convincing explanation for the absence 
of a lack of a theory of housing (that Ruonavaara attributes to Kemeny): housing is 
so manifestly embedded in other parts of society that the idea of a separate theory of 
housing makes no sense. 
Yet the GFC brought about something of a “crisis” in economics. Why had no one 
predicted it? Here we might distinguish between failures in economic models, and 
failure in economic theory. One explanation might be that as models are necessarily 
based on the observation of past relationships, they are susceptible to change. Is 
this explanation sufficient to negate theory? Probably not on its own. Outside the US, 
the credit crunch might be explained as being an “exogenous” shock - from outside 
the model.  But more fundamentally, the crisis in economics that followed the GFC 
focussed on the underlying assumption of the “rational” and “utility maximising” actor. 
Long before the GFC, this much criticised assumption that underpins classical 
economics gave rise to an emphasis on “behavioural” economics, with much 
vaunted inputs from psychology. First published in 2000, Robert Shiller’s Irrational 
Exuberance placed an emphasis on herd-like behaviour in explaining the stock 
market boom, placing an emphasis on hubristic psychology alongside structural and 
other factors. A chapter on real estate was added in the second edition (Schiller, 
2005). Another book, Animal Spirits (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009) also pointed to the 
need for a better understanding of human psychology among economic actors.    
It is worth quoting in full the section from Keynes’ General Theory from which the 
evocative term “animal spirits” is borrowed: 
“Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due 
to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive 
activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical 
expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our 
decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be 
drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal 
spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the 
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by 
quantitative probabilities.” (Keynes, 1936: 161-162) 
So, for at least 80 years, we have known that hubris can pay an important role in 
economic decisions. We have long known that expectations play a strong role in 
asset markets such as housing. Perhaps the problem was not theory per se, but the 
over-reliance placed on the ability of models to predict psychological behaviour. 
Housing bubbles and the fall-out from them can be likened to earthquakes: Everyone 
in San Francisco knows that there will be another major earthquake, but they don’t 
know when it will happen. 
This diversion into economics points to Ruonavaara’s further consideration of the 
relationship between housing and theory. The core of Kemeny’s original thesis is that 
housing researchers should apply “theoretical resources” from mainstream social 
science disciplines to housing (“theory about housing”) .  Further, it may be possible 
to utilise the study of housing to generate “concepts and ideas that are original, not 
imported from established disciplines outside housing studies” (p. xx). However, 
such concepts may fall short of true theory, being primarily categorical rather than 
identifying causal relationships. Overall, he concludes that, “[t]heorising about 
housing and from housing are ways to move forward. We need meta-theoretical 
statements about what housing from the scientific perspective is and here 
conceptual analysis and contemplation of housing experience can help… we need 
also to employ theoretical resources developed elsewhere” (p. xx). Broadly, this 
would describe the relationship between housing and economic theory: classical 
economics is applied to housing; observation of behaviour in housing markets and 
other related institutions may diverge from theory’s original specifications, leading to 
its evolution.  
Yet it also illustrates the importance of the “embeddedness” of housing institutions in 
society. The idea of embeddedness, associated with the economic sociologist Mark 
Granovetter (1985), emphasises the need to move beyond “utility maximising” 
individuals and to locate them within societal and cultural institutions. It is this 
attention to institutional and societal culture that provides the key to understanding 
why notionally similar policies or policy instruments do not necessarily operate in the 
same way in different cultures. 
A prime example of this is the failure of the export of the US model of housing 
finance to post-Soviet Russia. Russia was persuaded of the need to develop a 
housing finance system after it had privatised the bulk of its public housing after the 
collapse of the socialist system. Great effort was given to the creation of US-style 
agencies modelled on Fannie Mae in order to facilitate a secondary market in 
mortgage-backed securities. Today, the total size of the Russian mortgage market is 
only about 3% of GDP, the smallest of any of the European post-socialist countries. 
In her book, Housing the New Russia, economic sociologist Jane Zavisca (2012) 
conducted qualitative interviews in a Russian city and found a strong cultural 
resistance to mortgage debt. In North America and Western Europe, most people 
who own their houses with a mortgage still see themselves as being home owners. 
In Russia, however, they do not. The term used by interviewees to describe 
mortgaged home-ownership was kabala, which roughly translates as meaning “debt 
bondage”. So what is presented as the “American Dream” or the “Property Owning 
Democracy” means quite the reverse in another (cultural) context. When I gave this 
account at a conference reflecting on 25 years of “transition”, an American 
economist who was heavily involved with advising governments in post-socialist 
countries in the 1990s exclaimed, “… and now you’re telling me that people don’t 
want mortgages. Well, they sure do where I come from!” 
Theory, ethics and policy relevant research 
Whilst economics is capable of providing many of the tools with which to explain 
housing, it struggles with establishing an ethical basis from which to evaluate policy. 
Clapham examines the role of housing theory in policy relevant research (“research 
that impacts on the policy process in some way, .either directly or indirectly, and is 
used by any agency involved in that process”; p. xx). He identifies seven forms of 
intervention that governments or their agencies can make, ranging from non-
intervention to direct provision (and including subsidy and regulation in between). He 
notes the different models of the policy/ decision-making process, including rational 
decision making (and its pragmatic relation, satisficing|), and goes on to contrast 
these with the political approach through which policies are negotiated between and 
a structural approach based on control and instruments intended to influence 
behaviour. Clapham outlines three models of policy process: the rational; political; 
and structural. He goes on to argue that all policy research is in some way informed 
by a theoretical framework, even if it is not stated explicitly. This is a point with which 
I agree, but it is not the fundamental one.  
A crucial factor in policy research is that it must also make some kind of implicit 
judgement about preferred outcomes: the underlying ethics of public policy. Clapham 
makes the important distinction between outputs and outcomes. A government 
housing programme might succeed in meeting an output target, but these efforts are 
misplaced if the houses are built where no one wants to live. Consequently, he 
prefers the notion of “wellbeing” in order to assess policies. In doing so I think he is 
really calling for better indicators, rather than challenging the implicit underlying 
assumptions that underpin much policy (and especially economic) analysis. 
“Wellbeing” seems to me to be another iteration of “utility” reflecting the moral 
philosophy that historically underpins classical welfare economics. As Sen noted, 
utilitarianism enjoyed the status of “…something like ‘the official theory’ of welfare 
economics” (2009, p. 272). The focus on “wellbeing” is exemplified by Richard 
Layard’s Wellbeing Programme established at the London School of Economics in 
2001. This is an attempt to escape from judging outcomes in purely “economic” 
(meaning monetary) or material terms. A key empirical underpinning for this is the 
observation that increases in income in many countries does not result in 
corresponding increases in “happiness”. Hence: 
“To pursue happiness and wellbeing as the goal of public policy, it was clear 
that approaches to its measurement would need to be devised and that the 
causes of happiness and unhappiness would need to be understood in order 
to design remedies that were practical and cost-effective” (Layard, n.d.) 
Layard’s team went on to develop subjective measures of wellbeing, something that 
is overdue in housing studies. The need for such initiatives is illustrated by the way in 
which r espondents in the European Union’s Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions have somewhat different perceptions of sufficient housing space 
compared to the “objective” measure of overcrowding. Together with Chris 
Leishman, I have attempted to extend the “consensual” assessments of material 
deprivation pioneered by the Poverty and Social Exclusion project, by creating a 
“consensual” standard for housing deprivation, including overcrowding (Stephens 
and Leishman, 2017).  
However, what Layard and the advocates of wellbeing are really arguing for and 
what I attempted to create with Leishman, are most recognisably better forms of 
utilitarianism, and are certainly some form of consequentialism. This approach does 
not challenge the central underlying ethical assumption of traditional welfare 
economics. Nor is it immediately obvious whether measures of wellbeing seek to 
address the probable non-isomorphic (heterogeneous) character of individuals’ utility 
functions (Mirrlees, 1982). I will return to this point a little later.   
There is therefore a need in policy research to think more carefully about the 
underlying ethics of what researchers and policy makers are trying to achieve. 
Much housing–related research which addresses distributional issues is often sloppy 
because it does not engage with ethics. It is this absence of ethical consideration 
that can lead policy research down the path of lazy sloganizing, such as “housing for 
all” when referring to social/cost rental systems that are open to anyone regardless 
of need (Stephens, 2015). Self-evidently such housing, unless supplied to 
unnecessary excess, is not for “all”. Houses have doors, and doors have locks. If 
one person lives in a house then someone else cannot. This is obviously of ethical 
interest. 
So we need an ethical basis from which to make judgements about the distributional 
consequences of policies. An adherence to purely classical economics sanctions 
very little redistribution because it makes us prisoners of Pareto optimality (or 
economic efficiency), whereby a policy is sanctioned only if at least one person is 
made better off and none is made worse off. A central achievement of Rawls was to 
establish a liberal justification and route map out of Pareto’s distributional cul-de-sac. 
In A Theory of Justice (1972), Rawls’ critique of Pareto efficiency (in which he argues 
for “fair equality of opportunity”) flows into the section in which he establishes the 
“difference principle”. This provides an ethical basis for when inequality is justified, 
namely: “… the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they 
work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged 
members of society” (p. 75). In our “housing for all” example above, if the poorest 
and most vulnerable people are de-prioritised (or not always prioritised) in the 
allocation of social housing, then it is (just about) conceivable that such inequality 
might be justified by an application of the difference principle – if, for example, spatial 
concentrations of poor households could be shown to reinforce disadvantage.  But 
this would require (so far inconclusive) empirical support to triumph over hope or 
wishful thinking.  
Justice and utility are but two “goods” that compete for attention. A problem with 
adopting single ethical objectives is illustrated by the frequent adoption of 
“decommodification” as a benchmark against which to assess housing or other 
policies. It implies that the “ideal” system is one in which there is no material reward 
for working. (“Decommodification”, pace Esping-Andersen (1990) describes the 
situation when “… a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” 
(1990: 22).) Yet which democratic society would embrace this wholly as a moral 
underpinning to public policy? In the hey-day of social democratic Sweden, high 
levels of decommodification in unemployment benefits were made conditional on 
labour market participation at least partly because this was the only way to make a 
generous welfare state affordable (Vartiainen,1998). Even in supposedly full-blown 
socialist systems with remarkably “flat” wage structures, prioritisation in the allocation 
of work-unit (hence non-market) housing was used as a form of commodification to 
reward managerial responsibility and performance (Szelenyi, 1983; Stephens, et al, 
2016). 
Rawls’ (1972) used the term “primary goods” to incorporate a range of goods 
including civil and political rights and freedom, and placed these alongside income 
and wealth. This marked an attempt to address the plurality of “goods” over single 
sovereign goals. Sen (2009) has further argued that this can be transformed into his 
“capabilities approach” which relates to a series of capabilities to live a “good life”: 
beings and doings such as good health and loving relationships. His approach 
emphasises equality of the ability to choose what might be regarded as a good life: 
“individual advantage is judged by a person’s capability to do things that he or she 
has reason to value” (p. 231). In an earlier work, Sen (1983 noted that poverty is 
absolute in capability space (e.g. the ability to travel), but relative in commodity 
space (e.g. boots, horse, boat, train, car, aeroplane). In other words, as possibilities 
expand, the ability to attain the capability requires greater resources. The emphasis 
on the ability (capability) to choose different good lives at least partially enables a 
move beyond isomorphism. There are rich (and demanding) opportunities to apply 
this approach to housing policy, not least because it lies at the nexus of the attributes 
of a good life: security, home, community, health, work, education, leisure, and so 
on. 
 Conclusion 
The two Focus articles have the ability to prompt a valuable discussion in developing 
housing studies. A “grand theory” of housing is not possible because it is embedded 
in so many different institutional arrangements. Aside from the complexity of the 
issue, the interconnections that occur would surely require a theory of society as a 
whole to capture them. The introduction of wellbeing as an ethical underpinning is 
immensely valuable in that it requires us to re-consider what housing outcomes we 
should seek to promote through policy. This is, however, really a call for better 
utilitarianism that underpins traditional welfare economics. But why should utility 
(however measured) over-ride other widely supported goals? How does it address 
distributional questions? What if psychological fulfilment is predicated on diminished 
opportunities or expectations? Housing researchers need to engage with theories 
that address these deeply ethical questions. The unique features of housing would 
make it a fertile testing ground for capability-based approaches and in turn could 
assist in their development. 
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